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Reblogged by nadim@symbolic.software ("Nadim Kobeissi"):
bpreneel@infosec.exchange ("Bart Preneel") wrote:
The Belgian presidency has drafted yet another tweaked #chatcontrol proposal. In summary, the proposal remains completely unacceptable.
TLDR: All the problems pointed our in our earlier open letters are still there
https://nce.mpi-sp.org/index.php/s/eqjiKaAw9yYQF87
https://docs.google.com/document/d/13Aeex72MtFBjKhExRTooVMWN9TC-pbH-5LEaAbMF91Y/a) the risk of abuse of the solution for other applications (including political purposes)
b) the huge number of false positives (no waiting for 2 alerts does not work)
c) the fact that the real targets will use other technologies (e.g. sharing links to encrypted files).
d) chilling effect on teenagers.Summary of latest proposal:
- Detection of known CSAM and of new CSAM using AI (2 hits before you are reported) remain fully unacceptable because it just does not work for technical reasons pointed out earlier.
- Grooming detection in text and audio is abandoned; information is pseudonymized before it is reported (presumably identity of the user is known)
- User has to give consent before the client side scanning; details are not known but it is unclear what happens if consent is not given – is the message not sent? Why do policy makes believe that popups solve problems (cookies anyone)?
Source (in German):
https://netzpolitik.org/2024/internes-protokoll-belgien-will-nutzer-verpflichten-chatkontrolle-zuzustimmen/